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Abstract
The concept of  metacontingency was taught to 
undergraduate students of  Psychology by using a “game” 
simulation proposed originally by Vichi, Andery and 
Glenn (2009). Twenty-five students, distributed into 
three groups were exposed to six experimental sessions 
in which they had to make bets and divide the amounts 
gained. The three groups competed against each other 
for photocopies quotas. Two contingencies shifted over 
the sessions. Under Contingency B, the group would win 
points only if  in the previous round each member had 
received the same amount of  points and under Contingency 
A, winning was contingent on an unequal distribution 
of  the points. We observed that proportional divisions 
predominated independent of  the contingency in course. 
The manipulation of  cultural consequences (winning or 
losing points) produced consistent modifications in two 
response categories: 1) choices of  the value bet in each 
round, and 2) divisions of  the points among group members. 
Controlling relations between cultural consequences and 
Resumen
El concepto de Metacontingencias le fue enseñado a estudiantes 
de licenciatura de psicología utilizando una simulación 
propuesta originalmente por Vichi, Andery y Glenn (2009). 
Veinticinco estudiantes distribuidos en tres grupos fueron 
sometidos a seis sesiones experimentales en los que harían 
apuestas y dividirían las ganancias obtenidas. Los tres grupos 
compitieron entre sí por cantidades definidas de fotocopias. 
Fueron utilizadas dos contingencias durante las sesiones. En 
la contingencia B, el grupo ganaría puntos únicamente si 
durante la rodada anterior todos los miembros recibiesen un 
número de puntos igual entre ellos. Bajo la contingencia A, las 
ganancias eran referentes a la distribución desigual de puntos 
entre los miembros del equipo. Se observó la predominación 
de divisiones proporcionales independientemente de la 
contingencia en vigor. La manipulación de las consecuencias 
culturales (ganancia o pérdida de puntos) produjo cambios 
consistentes en las dos categorías de respuestas: (1) elección 
de los valores apostados en cada ronda y (2) división de los 
resultados de cada ronda entre los miembros. Las relaciones de 
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the behavior of  dividing were statistically significant 
in one of  the groups, whereas in the other two groups 
controlling relations were observed only in Contingency B. 
A review of  the reinforcement criteria used in the original 
experiment is suggested.
Key-words: Interlocking Contingencies, Metacontingency, Cultural 
contingencies, Social Behavior.
control entre las consecuencias culturales y el comportamiento 
de dividir fueron estadísticamente significativas en uno de los 
grupos, mientras que en los otros dos grupos estas relaciones 
de control se observaron solamente ante la contingencia B. 
Se sugiere la revisión de los criterios de refuerzo propuestos 
por el experimento original.
Palabras clave: Contingencias Entrelazadas, Metacontingencias, 
Contingencias Culturales,  Conducta Social.
Skinner´s (1981) proposal that behavior is determined 
by three levels of  selection – phylogenic, ontogenic 
and cultural – did not generate a systematic treatment 
regarding the third level until 1986, when Sigrid Glenn 
began to conceptualize and analyze such relations and 
called them “metacontingencies”. Since then, this concept 
has evolved through several reformulations creating a 
research field focused on developing a theoretical basis 
under the behavioral analytical approach to support the 
study of  cultures and social groups (Andery, Micheleto 
& Sério, 2005; Andery & Sério, 2001; Glenn, 1988, 1991, 
2003, 2004; Glenn & Malott, 2004; Malott & Glenn, 2006; 
Todorov, Moreira & Moreira, 2005). The present article 
adopted the metacontingency concept proposed by Martone 
and Todorov (2007) which states that it is “the relation 
between a group of  interlocking behavioral contingencies 
(IBC) and the effects caused in the environment by such 
interlock” (p.184). 
Despite the fact that metacontingencies deal with a 
different type of  selection focused on groups they do not 
involve any behavioral process other than those already 
known in the control of  individual behavior. This area’s 
contribution to the contingency concept is the description 
of  relations which affect not only the individuals’ behavior, 
but also interlocking behavioral contingencies (IBC) which 
produce broader consequences for groups of  individuals. 
The notion of  interlocking behavioral contingencies is based 
on the idea that in the social environment those stimuli and 
responses that are part of  individual contingencies tend to 
interlock with other people’s contingencies and become 
stimulus for new responses. The consequences of  these 
interlocks are called “cultural consequences”, emphasizing 
the effects on the survival or evolution of  the whole cultural 
group. Therefore, the study of  metacontingencies focuses 
on controlling relations of  the environment over IBCs. 
Controlling relations occur when the probability of  a given 
event is changed due to the occurrence of  a preceding 
one (Hunziker, 2003). If  the occurrence of  a cultural 
consequence alters the probability of  an interlock, there 
might be a controlling relation between the two events.
In pursuit of  creating experimental equivalents of  
cultural practices in the laboratory, Vichi (2004) and Vichi, 
Andery and Glenn (2009) investigated if  the interlocking 
behavior of  individual members of  a group could be 
modified by the manipulation of  cultural consequences. 
Two groups of  four undergraduate students were submitted 
to nine experimental sessions, in which they took part in 
a game. The participants were placed in front of  an 8x8 
matrix (columns and rows) in which the cells showed “+” 
and “-” signs in equal proportions and randomly distributed. 
The subjects received chips that could be exchanged for 
money by the end of  the session. The rounds started 
with the participants individually betting the chips, by 
placing them in a bet box. The group would then have 
to collectively choose a row number (1-8) after which the 
experimenter would pick a column, following a criteria 
unrevealed to the participants. If  the intersection of  row 
and column showed a “+” sign, the experimenter would 
double chips bet; if  the result was a “-“, the experimenter 
would extract half  of  the chips in the bet box. After that, 
the participants had to deposit some of  the chips to a 
‘savings’ box (collective decision) and divide the remaining 
chips among the members. By the end of  the experiment, 
the participants in each group would have to collectively 
decide how to distribute the “savings” among members. 
Occasionally, the experimenter could define the amount 
of  chips to be saved in a round.
The experimenter’s column choice was based on how 
the chips were divided among members in the previous 
trial, equally or unequally. The pattern of  equal or unequal 
divisions among group members (considered an IBC) 
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was the dependent variable. Two contingencies changed 
throughout the experiment: under condition A the “+” 
sign was contingent on equal chip division in the previous 
trial. Condition B imposed the opposite criteria, that is, 
the “+” sign would be chosen by the experimenter if  the 
division of  the previous trial resulted in unequal amounts 
of  chips returning to the participants. Contingencies A 
and B were reverted after ten consecutive winnings. The 
groups were exposed to both contingencies, but in reverse 
order: one began under condition A and the other under 
condition B.
The results showed that both groups had their collective 
behavior of  dividing the chips controlled by the manipulated 
contingencies, that is, divisions that produced the “+” sign 
became more frequent. The authors concluded that these 
results “can be taken as an indication that social practices 
are constructed as groups of  social contingencies under 
control of  their consequences” (Vichi et al., 2009, p. 68). 
These results were not replicated in posterior studies. Lopes 
(2010) pursued a direct replication of  this experiment 
whereas Martone (2008) introduced several alterations in 
the original procedure. In both, the earnings of  the “game” 
did not select or maintained the interlocked behavioral 
contingencies. 
Given the importance of  the investigative proposal 
made by Vichi et al. (2009), a new replication of  this 
procedure was conducted to examine if, despite the 
differences between the studied groups, the experimental 
variables manipulated would select collective behaviors 
(IBCs). It was attempted to maintain as much as possible 
of  the characteristics of  the original procedure in order to 
produce a systematic replication (cf. Sidman, 1960/1976). 
However, a few differences were inevitable due to the 
higher number of  participants here manipulated and to 
the fact that this study was conducted among the regular 
activities of  an undergraduate course. 
Method
Participants
25 undergraduate Psychology students participated in the 
experiment, 14 females and 11 males with ages ranging 
from 17 to 38 years-old. All the participants were taking 
the course called Experimental Analysis of  Behavior II 
(EAB II).            
Equipments 
A colored matrix, composed of  eight rows and eight 
columns, was used. The intersections contained “+” and 
“-” signs, in equal proportion, randomly distributed. It 
was printed in A4 size paper, analogous to the one used 
by Vichi (2004) (Figure 1). Colored plastic chips similar 
to the ones used in poker games were used six aluminum 
boxes (18x10x5cm), registry sheets, three stop watches 
and one video recorder.
Figure 1: Matrix with eight columns and eight rows numbered from 1 to 8, with 
equal quantity of + and – signs randomly distributed among the cells.
Procedure
The students´ participation was considered part of  their 
EAB II course, and their presence in each session resulted 
in 0.25 points added to their grades from the practice 
part of  the course. The students were divided into three 
groups (n= 8 or 9) and placed in separate rooms. Each 
group worked with one experimenter and an assistant who 
were course monitors. All students read and signed a free 
consent form to participate in this activity.
The rooms contained chairs distributed around a table, 
on which the matrix was placed, two boxes (one for the 
bets and another for the “savings”). In one of  the rooms 
there was a video recorder placed on a wall, framing 
the table and the participants. The experimenters and 
assistants remained in the rooms during the whole time 
of  the sessions.
The groups were named G1, G2, and G3 (G1 and G3, 
n=8; G2, n=9), and submitted to six consecutive sessions, 
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one per week. In the first session, the following instructions 
were read out loud by one of  the experimenters:
 “The research will be conducted in seven sessions 
of  approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes, in which 
three groups will participate. It consists of  a game 
on a matrix of  8 columns and 8 rows, that form cells 
containing a + or – sign in each, randomly distributed.
 At the beginning of  the first session, each participant 
will receive chips that are worth 110 points to be 
used in bets. By the end of  the session, the amount 
of  chips that remain with each player will belong to 
him/her and will accumulate for the next session. 
At the beginning of  the round, each participant will 
have half  a minute to individually decide how many 
points he/she will bet (minimum of  3 and maximum 
of  10). The chips will be put in the betting box and, 
summed up, will compose the group bet. Then, the 
group will have half  a minute to choose a row in the 
matrix. After the group choice is announced, the 
experimenter will reveal a column that was determined 
by a previously determined criterion, to which only 
she/he has access. If  the intersection between row 
and column presents a + sign, the group will receive 
double the points bet; if  it presents a – sign, they will 
lose half  of  the amount bet. A share of  this amount 
received by the group has to be deposited in a box 
called Savings. In some moments of  the game, the 
experimenter will decide the number of  points to be 
saved. The remaining points have to be distributed 
among the players, who have the liberty to decide how 
to do it. If  this distribution is not done in one minute 
and a half  after the savings deposit, the points in the 
box will belong to the experimenter. After this, a new 
round will begin. The session will last 30 rounds or 
2 hours, whichever comes first.
 The content of  the Savings will belong to the players 
at the end of  the last session. The group that achieves 
the highest amount of  points at the end of  the game 
will have its Savings doubled. It is up to the group 
to decide how these points will be divided among its 
members. After the end of  the experiment the points 
will be exchanged for photocopies at the college 
service.
 One of  the members of  the group (“dealer”) will be 
designated to register the bets and choices made by the 
participants in each round in a specific sheet, as well as 
the earnings obtained, how they were distributed and 
the amount of  points that each participant possesses 
at the end of  the session.”
Two experimenters (main and assistant) attended each 
experimental session, timing each round and registering 
four response classes: individual bets (choices of  number of  
chips bet), collective choice of  the row number, collective 
choice of  savings (quantity deposited in the “savings”) 
and type of  divisions (whether the chips were divided 
equally or unequally among the participants). As per the 
instructions, “bet” was considered a response class and 
named R1; the other registered responses were considered 
as interlocked behavioral contingencies, and named IBC1 
(row choice), IBC2 (saving choice) and IBC3 (divisions).
Each participant was responsible for his/her chips 
and bets. If  a subject lost all his/her chips during the 
game, this had to be manage by the group who could loan 
chips or make any other arrangements that would allow 
the colleague to continue playing. If  a participant missed 
a session, his/her chips were stored until his/her return.
All groups were exposed to six experimental sessions. 
The first round of  the experiment produced a “+” sign. 
After that, the column choice made by the experimenter was 
contingent on IBC3, that is, to the type of  division chosen by 
the participants on the previous round: in contingency A, the 
“+” sign was contingent on an equal division (all members 
receiving the same number of  points) and in contingency B 
to a different division of  the chips (at least one participant 
receiving a different amount of  points). If  this criterion was 
not met, the round would produce a “-” sign. If  the total 
of  bet chips was an odd number, the experimenter rounded 
up the earning in order to benefit the group.
G1 and G2 began the experiment in contingency 
A, and G3 in B. The contingencies changed after five 
rounds with consecutive “+” signs. After two contingency 
changes, this criterion was raised to ten consecutive “+” 
signs. If  there was five consecutive rounds with “-” signs, 
the experimenter would intervene by defining the amount 
of  points to be deposited in the “savings”, in order to 
increase the probability of  a division that attended the 
operating contingency. The intervention in “A” would 
leave a residual amount of  points that was a multiple of  
the number of  participants, increasing the chances of  an 
equal division; in “B”, the residual points were never a 
multiple of  the number of  participants, which guaranteed 
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that at least one participant, would receive a different 
number of  points. When the experimenter registered high 
frequencies of  winnings or losses due to “superstitious” 
strategies (verbally reported by the participants), she/he 
would intervene further to expose the participants to the 
programmed contingency.
The competition among the groups was established 
in order to increase the reinforcement value of  the chips.
Results
Figure 2 shows the effect of  IBC3 (dividing responses) in 
terms of  accumulated wins (production of  “+” on each 
round). Every time the participants produced a “+” sign 
by choosing the correct division, one point is added to the 
line, whereas “-” signs are represented by steady lines. The 
small vertical traces along the line of  cumulative wins mark 
the rounds in which the experimenters intervened on the 
“savings” deposit; the contingency changes are signaled 
by the line that vertically divides the figure. 
The dividing response (IBC3) changed as a function 
of  the operating contingency. However, each groups 
needed different exposure time under the contingency 
before reaching the contingency changing criterion. The 
comparison between G1 and G2, both beginning in 
contingency A, shows that while G1 reached this criterion 
in the middle of  session 3, G2 only reached it at the middle 
of  session 5; consequently, G2 remained less time exposed 
to contingency B and the experiment ended without 
showing controlling relations under this contingency. 
The comparison between G1 and G3 shows that the 
pattern of  IBC3 controlled by one contingency interfered 
with the subsequent pattern controlled by the opposite 
contingency. Contingency B (reinforcement of  different 
division) produced a high frequency of  reinforcement when 
it was first presented to the group, but this frequency was 
reduced in subsequent presentations after Contingency A 
(especially in the last occurrence of  B). 
There was also a difference in the number of  rounds 
necessary to adjust after the contingency inverted: G1 
showed a pattern of  successive reduction of  adjusting 
time to the current contingency, while G3 showed variable 
durations in successive phases A and B. Despite these 
differences the IBC3 pattern (types of  divisions) was 
modified by the operating contingency in all three groups.
The visual inspections which supported these analyses 
are not fully confirmed statistically. Considering that only 
two possible dividing responses were permitted (equal or 
unequal), the verification of  contingency control over these 
responses depends on the confirmation that the correct 
responses proportion was above 50%. In G1, the total 
proportion of  correct divisions after each winning round 
was 63.4% (Z=2.43; p=0.008). This higher proportion 
was confirmed in both contingencies (Contingency A: 
60.4%, Z=2.07 p=0.019; Contingency B: 67.7%, Z= 2.89 
p=0.002). In G2 and G3 the proportion of  “+” signs 
subsequent to winnings was 58.0% and 55.1% respectively, 
but they were not statistically superior to 50% considering 
α=0.05 (G2: Z=1.44, p=0.074; G3: Z=0.91, p=0.182). 
Controlling relations of  earnings over division responses 
were confirmed for both G2 and G3 under contingency 
B (G2: Z=2.42, p=0.007 and G3: Z=2.92, p=0.002). 
However, statistical significance was not reached when 
they were under contingency A.
Figure 2: Cumulative records of winnings (“+”) along the sessions under contingen-
cies A and B. The small vertical traces on the winnings line mark the rounds in 
which the experimenter intervened by defining the “savings”.
Although IBC3 refers to only two types of  chips 
divisions (“equal” or “unequal”) to which consequences 
were applied, some groups adopted a third division pattern: 
proportional. Proportional divisions are those that meet 
at least one of  the following criteria: 
(1)  If  the participant bet more points than the others and 
at the end of  the round received more points than 
the other participants;
(2)  If  the participant bet less and received less than the 
others;
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(3)  If, after eight or nine rounds (depending if  the group 
was composed of  eight or nine participants) the sum 
of  the individually-received points was identical for 
all participants. This criterion was established due 
to some groups having agreed that only one point 
would be deposited as “savings”, and that this point 
would be taken from one of  the participants. In the 
subsequent round, the “saved” point would be taken 
from another participant, thus leading to a “rotation” 
system. With this strategy, by the end of  eight or nine 
rounds, all participants would have received equal 
points, maintaining a proportional division.
Proportionality for each round can be seen in Figure 
3. The intertwining lines in the first few sessions show 
that all groups started with indifferent patters towards 
proportional or non-proportional divisions. In G1 and 
G3, the proportional pattern became predominant from 
the third session on. G2 showed a predominance of  non-
proportional divisions until the final sessions. Since the 
order of  exposure to the contingencies was similar for G1 
and G2, a functional relation between the proportionality 
of  the division and the operating contingency cannot be 
identified. However, the pattern shown by most of  the 
groups suggests that the contingency might have affected 
IBC3. By manipulating the individual bets (R1) some 
groups maintained a pattern of  proportionality at the 
same time they complied with the criterion of  the running 
contingency (A or B). If  a group consistently bets unequal 
amounts and divide them unequally (i.e. proportionally), the 
reinforcement criterion of  contingency B would be met, 
whereas to comply with Contingency A the participants 
can bet equal amounts and divide them equally (thus, 
proportionally). So, by coordinating individual bets (R1) 
the groups may produce high reinforcement frequencies 
under both contingencies through the selection of  a third 
type of  IBC3: proportional.
The standard deviation among individual bets (R1) 
for each round is presented in Figure 4. A high standard 
deviation indicates that for that round the participants 
bet different points among themselves; a low standard 
deviation indicates that all members bet the same number 
of  points in that round. The three groups differed in that 
account. Groups G1 and G2 varied between similar or 
different bets, whereas G3 adopted a stable pattern of  
identical bets from the third session on with exception to 
only one round in session 5. 
Figure 3: Cumulative frequency of proportional and non-proportional divisions over 
the six experimental sessions. The vertical line indicates contingency changes (A 
and B).
Figure 4: Standard deviation of the bets (R1) in each round.
Figure 5 shows the sum of  individual bets (R1) for 
each group (lines) and the rounds that presented wins 
(bars under the lines). Winnings clusters (several bars 
together) and losses clusters (blocks of  empty space) 
are observed, as well as moments of  intermittence of  
wins and losses. Apparently there were correspondences 
between wins/losses and the amount bet, which increased 
after the third session. In G1 and G2 the winnings were 
intermittent until the first half  of  the third session, being 
accompanied by erratic bets. In G3, the beginning of  the 
first session shows that a winning cluster occurred at the 
same time as an increase of  points bet, being succeeded 
by a period of  intermittent winnings and inconsistent bets. 
The beginning of  Session 4 shows an increase in winnings 
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and bets, followed by a reduction in bets accompanied by 
losses on the middle of  that session. In the second half  
of  Session 5, a winning cluster occurred at the same time 
as an increase of  points bet. A similar correspondence 
occurred in Session 5 of  G2. 
Figure 5: Total points bet (lines) and consequences of winnings (bars).
Both IBC1 (row choice) as IBC2 (savings) apparently 
were not consistently affected by the manipulated 
contingencies. It can be reported in informal terms that 
in Session 1 the participants searched for relations between 
the row number and winnings, which is compatible with 
the fact that IBC1 occurred immediately before the 
column announcement, which in turn generated wins or 
losses. Therefore, probably due 0 to contiguity, this was 
the first response that was scrutinized in the search for the 
reinforcement criterion. However, the participants rapidly 
abandoned this approach and sought other behaviors that 
possibly generated the gains. The analysis of  IBC2 was 
obstructed by the experimenter’s interventions on savings. 
Discussion
Results showed direct effects of  reinforcement over IBC3 
and indirect effects over R1. Two effects were observed 
in IBC3. If, as in Vichi et al (2009) and Lopes (2010), 
the study considers only if  successive gains reached the 
criterion for contingency change, then we can state that 
the data here obtained replicated the ones from Vichi et 
al. and disagree with the ones from Lopes, since all groups 
reached these criteria. In this sense, the contingencies here 
manipulated established control over collective behaviors, 
being an experimental analogous to metacontingencies.
However, the statistical analysis did not confirm 
the establishment of  control by Contingency A, only 
by contingency B. Since Vichi et al. (2009) and Lopes 
(2010) did not conduct such statistical treatment, the 
comparison cannot be made. This data suggests that 
this procedure needs to be refined in order to obtain 
reliable analogous of  metacontingencies with all the 
implemented contingencies. Since it is a group design, this 
analysis demands a demonstration that the differences are 
statistically significant.
The instructions establish R1 (bet choice) as an individual 
response, while the other categories are considered collective. 
However, the individuality of  R1 was not confirmed during 
the procedure: standard deviation of  bets decreased, 
in general, as the experiment went on, that is, the bets 
became gradually more similar among members of  the 
group. More informally, the video recording showed 
that verbalizations such as “how much are you betting?” 
became more frequent. Also, some participants followed 
the orientation of  a “leader”, suggesting that the betting 
responses may have become collective, or an IBC.
The combination of  Figures 3 and 5 (changes obtained 
in IBC3 and R1, respectively) provides support for an 
alternative hypothesis for how and which kind of  controlling 
relations were established by this procedure. Figure 3 shows 
a “standardization” tendency of  the bets and a selection 
of  proportional divisions of  the round results throughout 
the experiment. The participants´ behavior may have been 
under control of  both earning points and maintaining an 
equal status among group members. In our society, there 
is a rule that a “fair” earning should be proportional to 
risks taken: it is culturally considered “fair” that if  someone 
risks more (ex: bets more), that person should earn more 
if  the choice was correct (since losses would be higher if  
the choice was incorrect). Since the participants of  this 
study maintained social contact outside the sessions, it is 
possible that part of  their dividing responses occurred 
under control of  this cultural rule, balancing the bets 
(“risks”) and compensation (earnings in the division). This 
process was informally observed in verbal phrases such 
as “I bet more than you, so it is fair that I receive more”.
Another possibility is that the stability of  social intra-
group relationships could have been regulated by the 
competition condition. If  a member of  one of  the groups 
felt that the division was “unfair”, the group could be 
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weakened by more fragile social relationships and become 
less competitive towards the others. It may be interesting 
to investigate if  the contingencies established by this 
experimental procedure would be strong enough to regulate 
non-proportional choices among the participants, even if  
they can be considered “unfair”. For this, the suggestion 
would be to replicate this study using proportional or 
non-proportional divisions as IBC3. 
Some modifications of  the original procedures could 
have partially influenced the results. One was the quantity 
of  points received by the participants at the beginning 
of  each session. In the procedure conducted by Vichi et 
al. (2009) and followed by Lopes (2010), the participants 
received 110 points at the beginning of  each session. That 
is, the winning and losing consequences of  each session 
remained restricted for that session without extensions to 
the others. In the present study this amount was received 
only in the first session, whereas in the following sessions 
the participants began with the chips remaining from the 
previous ones. This produced a continuous exposition of  
the participants to the effects of  their previous decisions. 
This difference may have altered the consequence magnitude 
manipulated by the experimenter. Even though Vichi et 
al., obtained the effects of  the established contingencies, 
it is possible that this effect could be more potent if  the 
procedure adopted here was used.
A second procedural change was the gradual increase in 
the criterion for contingency change, from five consecutive 
wins in the first three changes, to ten consecutive wins 
thereafter. Both Vichi et al. (2009) and Lopes (2010) used 
the criterion of  ten consecutive wins since the beginning of  
the experiment. However, the effect of  this change is not 
clear since the results were not systematic for all groups. 
On the one hand, this condition could have promoted a 
gradual learning and also the exposure of  all participants 
to both contingencies. But on the other hand, it could 
have made the control by the manipulated contingencies 
more difficult since, as shown in G3, the strengthening of  
a division pattern made learning the opposed pattern more 
difficult. Thus, more studies need to be conducted to verify 
if  the gradual increase in contingency change requirement 
is, in fact, a critical variable of  this experimental design.
As a matter of  fact, because of  the reinforcers used, 
the exchange of  chips for photocopies at the end of  the 
study seemed to have had little effect in maintaining the 
students engaged in the task, despite the a priori assumption 
that this exchange could be reinforcer. Participants seemed 
to be more motivated by the “intellectual challenge” of  
trying to discover the reinforcement criterion, and the 
fact of  “winning points”, especially in a group-competing 
environment. Therefore, the competition condition should 
be maintained in future studies as a way to increase the 
points´ reinforcement value, without the need to exchange 
them for other materials.
Finally, it is worth noting that this experiment was a 
stimulating didactic tool. The students voluntarily met after 
the sessions to hypothesize on possible experimental criteria, 
compare their groups´ performances in the competition, 
and define strategies for the sessions. This experiment 
engaged them in the practice activities of  the course and 
apparently amplified their interest in the theoretical part 
which suggests that it was a highly appropriate auxiliary 
instrument in teaching Behavior Analysis. 
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